An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects. A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced a class of assignment games arising from these assignment situations.
Introduction
An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects. An illustration of such a two-sided market is, for example, the housing market. In this situation one set of objects is a collection of houses, where different houses are owned by different agents (the group of sellers). The other set of objects is a collection of agents where each agent wants to buy exactly one house (the group of buyers). Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced assignment games, a class of cooperative games, in order to analyze these assignment situations. They showed that these games have a non-empty core. Quint (1991) showed that the core of assignment games have a lattice structure. Raghavan (1994, 2001) provided a polynomial algorithm for the nucleolus of assignment games and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of the core. Hamers et al. (2002) proved that all extreme points of the core are marginal vectors, in spite of the fact that assignment games need not be convex. Núñez and Rafels (2003) characterize the extreme points of assignment games by means of the reduced marginal worth vectors. This paper analyzes assignment situations in which an object can be owned by several agents and where agents can participate in the ownership of more than one object. We will refer to these assignment situations as assignment situations with multiple ownership, AMO for short. An AMO is described by two disjoint sets of agents, two disjoint sets of objects and the description of which agent(s) own(s) which objects. If an object of one set is assigned to an object of the other set there will be some reward. This reward will be described using a reward matrix. Similar to Shapley and Shubik (1972) we define simple assignment games, a class of cooperative games arising from an AMO and a non-negative reward matrix. In a simple assignment game each coalition can only match objects that are completely owned by this coalition. Moreover, if a player is participating in the ownership of more than one object, at most one of these objects can be matched. In the relaxations of simple assignment games this last restriction is relaxed, i.e. if a player is participating in more than one object, at most two (three, ..., etc.) of these objects can be matched.
The house market is still a nice example of this model. The properties of the sellers can be apartment buildings or shopping malls which usually are owned by several agents.
Moreover, it can be that some agents are involved in the ownership of several apartment buildings or shopping malls. The buyers can be viewed as a group of investors which are interested in apartment buildings or shopping malls. Obviously, one investor can be member of more than one investor group. The possible restrictions on the number of apartment buildings or shopping malls that can be sold or bought can be imposed by governmental rules, for example, to resist monopolies in city areas of owners of apartments or shopping malls.
We call an AMO balanced if for any choice of the non-negative reward matrix the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced. We will characterize balanced AMO by requiring a structure on the ownership of the objects by the agents. This line of research has been applied by Herer and Penn (1995) and Granot et al. (1999) to characterize submodular and balanced graphs with respect to traveling salesman problems and Chinese postman problems, respectively. Finally, we will study relaxations of simple assignment games and provide sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce formally the AMO's and the corresponding simple assignment games. Section 3 is devoted to balanced AMO's. Finally, in Section 4 we provide a sufficient condition for balancedness of the relaxations of simple assignment games by formulating these games as Integer Linear Programming problems.
The assignment model and its game
In this section we introduce assignment situations with multiple ownership and its corresponding games.
An assignment situation with multiple ownership ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )), for short AMO, consists of two finite and disjoint agent (player) sets M 1 and M 2 , two finite and disjoint sets of objects A 1 and A 2 and functions S i :
the set of agents that own some object. Specifically, for object a ∈ A i the set S i (a) is the subset of agents in M i that own object a. It is assumed that ∪ a∈A i S i (a) = M i for i = 1, 2 and S i (a) = ∅ for any a ∈ A i and i = 1, 2. These assumptions imply that each agent of M i is involved in the ownership of at least one object of A i and that each object is owned by at least one agent. Observe that it is not excluded that agents are involved in the ownership of more than one object. If an object of A 1 is matched with an object of A 2 , there can be obtained some reward. A non-negative matrix R ∈ IR A 1 ×A 2 expresses this reward. So, if object a ∈ A 1 is assigned to object b ∈ A 2 , then the reward is equal to R ab ≥ 0. Observe that the assignment situations as discussed in Shapley and Shubik (1972) can be seen as a special class of AMO's with a reward matrix. Now, we follow the same line as in Shapley and Shubik (1972) to define a simple assignment game that arises from an AMO. Let ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) be an AMO. Let
be the objects that are completely owned by the members of coalition T i . A matching µ for T 1 ∪ T 2 consists of pairwise disjoint pairs in B 1 (T 1 ) × B 2 (T 2 ). Hence, for a coalition T 1 ∪ T 2 the definition of a matching implies that we can only assign objects that are completely owned by members of coalition T 1 ∪ T 2 and each of these objects is assigned to at most one other object. A matching µ is called admissible if for any two distinct pairs (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ) ∈ µ it holds S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅ and S 2 (b 1 ) ∩ S 2 (b 2 ) = ∅. The restriction to admissible matchings implies that for each player at most one object is matched where he is participating in. The set of admissible matchings with respect to coalition T 1 ∪ T 2 is denoted by A(T 1 ∪ T 2 ).
Let ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) be an AMO and R a non-negative reward matrix. The
i.e. the worth of a coalition is the maximum value of an admissible matching for this coalition.
is the assignment game as defined in Shapley and Shubik (1972) , arising from the situation (A 1 , A 2 , R) in which the agents are identified with the objects.
The following example illustrates an AMO and its corresponding game. Moveover, this example shows that the core of a simple assignment game can be empty. The core of a cooperative game (N, v) is defined by
, then no coalition in S ⊂ N has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition if x is the proposed vector of revenue shares. A game (N, v) is balanced if it has a non-empty core.
Example 2.1 Figure 1 displays an AMO ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) with reward matrix R. The rows and columns of R represent the objects of A 1 and A 2 , respectively. The players owning an object are printed bold behind the rows and above the columns. For example, column 2 represents the second object of A 2 which is owned by players 3 and 4. 
) reflects the matching of the objects in row 1 (2) and column 1 (3). This matching yields a reward of 2. The matching {(r 1 , c 1 ), (r 2 , c 2 )} is inadmissible because player 3 is participating in the ownership of c 1 and c 2 and we assumed that each player could be matched at most once. It is straightforward to
It follows that this simple assignment game has an empty core, because if (
which is a contradiction. 2
In the following sections balancedness of simple assignment games and its relaxations will be studied.
Balanced assignment situations with multiple ownership
In this section we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness of AMO's.
An AMO is called balanced if for any reward matrix R the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced.
First, we show that for AMO's in which each agent (player) is participating in one object, are balanced.
Proposition 3.1 An AMO in which each agent is participating in precisely one object is balanced.
be the assignment game, as defined in Shapley and Shubik (1972) , arising from the situation (A 1 , A 2 , R) in which the agents are identified with the objects. Because assignment games are balanced there exists a vector
Observe that the first inequality holds since u A 1 ≥ 0 and v A 2 ≥ 0, the second inequality holds
Moreover, for the grand coalition all inequalities are equalities,
Next, we will define two properties that fully characterize balanced AMO's.
The first condition states that there is at least one player participating in each object of a partition element. The second condition states that player sets corresponding to two different partition elements have no player in common. Observe, that AMO's where each player is participating in precisely one object satisfies the partitioning property. We illustrate an AMO that satisfies the partitioning property in the following example.
it is straightforward to verify that this AMO satisfies the partitioning property.
2
Hence, an AMO satisfies the intersection property if all row objects or all column objects have at least one player in common. The following example illustrates the intersection property. Proof: First observe that if |A 1 | = 1 or |A 2 | = 1 then trivially the intersection property holds and for any reward function the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced.
Hence, we have to prove the theorem for |A 1 | ≥ 2 and |A 2 | ≥ 2.
We first prove the "if"-part. Let ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) be an AMO and let R be a reward matrix. Let (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v) be the corresponding simple assignment game. First assume that ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) satisfies the partitioning property. Hence, for i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a partition {A 1 i , A 2 i , ..., A k i i } that satisfies the conditions in the partitioning property. From this AMO we create a new AMO that satisfies the condition of Proposition 3.1. First, we will merge the objects in one partition element to one object and these merged objects will be owned by the intersection of the players that own the objects in the partition element. Second, the reward between two new objects is the maximum reward that can be achieved between two objects in the corresponding partition elements. Formally, be the game corresponding to the induced AMO andR. Because the induced AMO satisfies the condition of Proposition 3.1, we have that Core(w) = ∅. Letx ∈ Core(w) and define
x ∈ IR M 1 ∪M 2 as x i =x i if i ∈M 1 ∪M 2 and x i = 0 otherwise. We show that x ∈ Core(v).
The first inequality holds becausex ∈ Core(w) and the second because
Secondly, assume that ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) satisfies the intersection property. Without loss of generality we assume that
Then
Second we prove the "only if"-part. We show that if an AMO does not satisfy the partition property and the intersection property, then it is not balanced. Assume that ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) does not satisfy the intersection property. This implies that a∈A 1 S 1 (a) = ∅ and b∈A 2 S 2 (b) = ∅. We distinguish between two cases:
(i) For all a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 holds S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅, or
(ii) There exists a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 with S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅, and
Assume that (i) holds. Without loss of generality assume that S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅ for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ A 1 . Then take the reward matrix R in which every entry is equal to 1. Let (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v) be the simple assignment game corresponding to ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) and R. Since the intersection of the player sets of any two objects in A 1 is not empty, at most one object of A 1 can be assigned to an object of A 2 . Hence, it follows that v(M 1 ∪ M 2 ) = 1 and, due to the fact that the intersection property is not satisfied, v(M 1 ∪ M 2 \{i}) = 1 for
The graph G consists of several connected components that partition A 1 in a natural way. Let {B 1 , B 2 , . .., B k } be this partition. Hence, if a, b ∈ B j for some j ∈ {1, ..., k} then there exists a path from a to b. A similar partition can be constructed for A 2 . Since ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) does not satisfy the partitioning property, we can assume (without loss of generality) that there exists a j ∈ {1, ..., k} such that a∈B j S 1 (a) = ∅. Now, one of the following two cases is satisfied:
(α) for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ B j ,a 1 = a 2 , it holds S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅, (β) there exists a 1 , a 2 ∈ B j ,a 1 = a 2 , with S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅.
If case (α) holds, we define the reward matrix R by R ab = 1 for all a ∈ B j , b ∈ A 2 and R ab = 0 otherwise. Since a∈B j S 1 (a) = ∅, B j contains at least two objects. Hence, we can
This observation holds by the following argument. Recall that B j is a connected component of the graph G. Because S 1 (a 1 ) ∩ S 1 (a 2 ) = ∅ for some a 1 , a 2 ∈ B j , a 1 = a 2 , the graph is not complete. Hence, there is a path of length two in G. The vertices on this path satisfy the required property. According to assumption (ii)
In this section we discuss k-AMO games, relaxations of simple assignment games. We provide sufficient conditions for balancedness of k-AMO games. First we will introduce the class of k-AMO games.
Let ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) be an AMO. A matching µ in B 1 (T 1 ) × B 2 (T 2 ) is called kadmissible for coalition T 1 ∪T 2 if for any k +1 pairwise distinct pairs (a 1 , b 1 ), ..., (a k+1 , b 
Observe that the restriction to k-admissible matchings implies that a player that owns more than k objects can assign at most k objects.
The set of k-admissible matchings with respect to a coalition T 1 ∪ T 2 is denoted by
Let ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) be an AMO and let R be a non-negative reward matrix.
Observe that a simple assignment game coincides with a 1-AMO game. The following example shows a 2-AMO game. Next, we will formulate (2) as an Integer Linear Programming problem. For every i ∈
, where e consists of all vectors e i , i ∈ M 1 ∪ M 2 and f consists of all vectors
So, the j-th row of u T 1 ∪T 2 (k) corresponds to the j-th row of the matrix A, i.e., if the j-th row of u T 1 ∪T 2 (k)
represents player i or object a, then also the j-th row of the matrix A represents player i or object a. Now, it is straightforward to verify that (2) is equivalent to the following ILP problem: Deng et al. (1999) introduced the class of combinatorial games. Let N be the finite set of players and M be a finite set with cardinality n and m, respectively. A combinatorial
where B is a n × m {0, 1}-matrix and 1 S i = 1 if i ∈ S and 1 S i = 0 otherwise. Deng et al. (1999) proved the following theorem. It follows immediately that for k = 1 the ILP formulation (3) is a special case of the ILP formulation of (4). Hence, we have the following corollary. Obviously, the result of Deng et al. (1999) can not be applied to k-AMO games for k ≥ 2 because the right-hand side vector in (3) is not a {0, 1}-vector. Indeed, the following example illustrates that the core of a k-AMO game can be non-empty although the ILP optimum does not coincide with the optimum of its LP relaxation. Then, for the corresponding 2-AMO game (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v 2 ) it holds v 2 (M 1 ∪ M 2 ) = 2, which is the optimal solution of the ILP-problem (3) of the grand coalition. But the optimal solution of the corresponding LP-relaxation is 8 3 which is larger than the worth of the grand coalition. However, it is straightforward to check that ( 1 2 , 1 2 , 1 2 , 1 2 , 0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ Core(v 2 ).
The following theorem shows that the coincidence of the optimum of the ILP-problem and its relaxation is still a sufficient condition to have a balanced k-AMO game.
Theorem 4.5 Let ((M 1 , M 2 ), (A 1 , A 2 ), (S 1 , S 2 )) be an AMO and let R be a reward matrix.
Let (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v k ) be the corresponding k-AMO game. If the optimum of the ILP-problem
(3) of the grand coalition coincides with the optimum of its LP-relaxation, then the corresponding k-AMO game is balanced.
Proof: The LP relaxation of (3) is equal to max a∈A 1 ,b∈A 2 R ab y ab
subject to Ay ≤ u T 1 ∪T 2 (k),
The dual of (5) is equal to min z T · u T 1 ∪T 2 (k)
subject to A T z ≥ R,
where R = (R ab ) a∈A 1 ,b∈A 2 . Let (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v k ) be the corresponding k-AMO game. By the assumption in the theorem and the duality theorem of LP there exists an optimal solution z * of (6) such that v k (M 1 ∪ M 2 ) = z * T · u M 1 ∪M 2 (k). Now, we define the |M 1 | + |M 2 | dimensional vector x by x i = kz * i + a∈A 1 :i∈S 1 (a) z * a |S 1 (a)| for all i ∈ M 1 and x j = kz * j + b∈A 2 :j∈S 2 (b)
for all j ∈ M 2 . We prove that x is in the core of v k . Let T 1 ⊂ M 1 , T 2 ⊂ M 2 . Then
where the last inequality holds because for any coalition the feasible region in the dual problem (6) is identical. Hence, z * is a feasible solution (6) for T 1 ∪ T 2 . Evidently, for M 1 ∪ M 2 all inequalities become equalities, which completes the proof. 2
We conclude this section with two examples. They show that there is no relation between the cores of consecutive k-AMO games. Let (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v 1 ) be the corresponding simple assignment game. Then v 1 (M 1 ∪ M 2 ) = 3 and the core is non-empty since for instance, (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) ∈ Core(v 1 ). We now show that Core(v 2 ) = ∅.
Let (M 1 ∪ M 2 , v 2 ) be the corresponding 2-AMO game. Then v 2 ({1, 2, 4, 5}) = 3, v 2 ({1, 3, 4, 6}) = 3, v 2 ({2, 3, 5, 6}) = 3 and v 2 (M 1 ∪M 2 ) = 4. Suppose (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 ) ∈
